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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED,
By FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANK, a
corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
ROGER T. HARMSTON, Administrator of
the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased,
ROGER T. HARMSTON, FRED HARMSTON, HELENE E. GILLIS and MARION
EUGENE HARMSTON, as the Heirs at Law
of Isabelle T. Hannston, Deceased,
Appellants.

CASE
NO. 8464

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE
While the same question that is presented on this appeal was presented on the appeal of the consolidated cases
of Harmston et al v. Labrum et al and Harmston v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, which is reported in 247 Pac. (2d)
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895, such cases are in no sense the same as this case.
Neither the pleadings nor the parties are the same. One
of the reasons for the reversal of the judgment in the former cases was that the pleadings did not raise the issue
of whether or not an oath of office had been taken by Roger
T. Harmston in the estate of Isabelle T. Hlarmston, deceased, and thereafter lost or destroyed.
The appellants seem to take the position that the above
mentioned opinion requires the respondent to proceed in
the suits brought to vacate the judgments of foreclosure
of mortgages involved in the former proceeding before this
Court. As we understand appellants' position, it is that
the court below erred in permitting the question of whether
Roger T. Harmston had or had not taken an oath of office
as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston to
be tried out in the probate proceedings of that estate.
We do not find anything that was said or decided in
the opinion rendered by this Court in the case above mentioned that supports such a claim. Indeed it is, to say the
least, very doubtful if a valid determination of whether or
not Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office as contended by the Farmers and Merchants Bank could be had
in the suit brought to vacate the mortgage foreclosure proceedings had by that bank. While a regularly appointed
and qualified administrator has authority to represent the
heirs at law of the decedent of whose estate he is the administrator, the matter here contested is whether or not
Roger T. Harmston was such administrator at the time
he was served with Summons and at the time the foreclosure of the mortgages were had. The heirs at law of
Isabelle T. Harmston have an interest in the determination
of whether or not Roger T. Harmston was the adrninistraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tor of theirc mother's estate at the time here involved, and
as such are indispensable parties to such a controversy.
39 Am. Jur. 852-54 and cases there cited. There is no basis
for Roger T. Harmston to represent the other heirs at law
of Isabelle T. Harmston in a controversy involving the question of whether or not he, Roger T. Harmston, was administrator of such estate at the time involved in this controversy. Moreover, •it seems obvious that if the record of
the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston is to be corrected or reestablished, it must be in such estate and not in some other
action.
It will be seen that the former suit brought against the
Farmers & Merchants Bank was so brought by Roger T.
Harmston as administrator of the estate of Isabelle· T.
Harmston, deceased. The other heirs of Mrs. Harmston
were not parties to that suit and therefore would not be
bound by a determination of whether or not Roger T.
Harmston was the administrator of his mother's estate at
the time here involved. We shall have more to say about
this phase of the case in answer to what appellants have
to say about the same.
The appellants, in their brief, have cited an imposing
array of cases and authorities, most of which, we believe,
are foreign to the issues which this Court is called upon
to determine on this appeal. In our view, the only questions which are before this Court for review are:
1. Did the court below commit prejudicial error in
determining the question of whether or not Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office (as contended for by the
respondent) by a proceeding had in the matter of the estate of IsaJbelle T. Harmston, deceased, and if so, the substance of such oath?
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2. Did the court below commit prejudicial error in
the admission of evidence?
3. Did the court below commit prejudicial error in
excluding evidence?
4. Does the evidence support the findings of the trial
court?
A brief summary of the evidence concerning which
there is no conflict is as follows:
There was received in evidence the files in two mortgage foreclosure proceedings wherein Farmers & Merchants Bank appeared as plaintiff and Roger T. Harmston,
as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, appeared as one of the defendants. Such cases were Civil
1931 and 1932 (Tr. 30 to 34, both inclusive). Certified
copies of the Findings, Conclusion and Decree in those cases
have been brought up as a part of the record. We quote
a portion of the Findings so made in this case:
"1. That Isabelle T. Harmston died intestate on
December 11, 1937 in Duchesne County, Utah.
"2. That at the time of her death said Isabelle
T. Harmston was a resident of Duchesne County, Utah
and that she left as a part of her estate real property
situated in Duchesne County, Utah.
"3. That during her lifetime and on July 31, 1937,
Isabelle T. Harmston made, executed and delivered to
the petitioners herein, Farmers & Merchants Bank,
her Promissory Note in the principal sum of $4500.00,
which note was secured by a mortgage executed by
said Isabelle T. Harmston on a part of the real property belonging to said estate.
"4. That during her lifetime and on October 19,
1937 the said Isabelle T. Harmston executed and deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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·or~

livered to the Farmers & Merchants Bank another
promissory note in the sum of $2500.00, and also made,
executed and delivered to the Farmers & Merchants
Bank as security for the payment of such note, a mortgage for $2500.00 on a part of the real property belonging to said estate.
"8. That on December 7, 1940 the Utah Savings
& Trust Company was removed as administrator of

the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased and Roger
T. lfurmston was appointed administrator of said estate to succeed the Utah Savings & Trust Company.
The Order appointing Roger T. Harmston administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased,
required that he take the Oath of Office and furnish
·a bond in the sum of $1500.00 if a corporate bond.
"9. That on March 8, 1941 Roger T. Harmston
furnished and filed the required corporate bond in the
sum of $1500.00, and that on or about March 8, 1941,
Roger T. Harmston took his Oath of Office as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased,
and that thereupon Letters of Administration were
issued to him and that the said Roger T. Harmston
now is and since March 8, 1941 has been the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased.
"10. That the form of the Oath of Office so taken and the Letters of Administration so issued were
substantially as by law required; that is to say, the
Oath of Office was in substantially the following form:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, PROBATE DIVISION,
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH
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IN THIE MA'ITER
OF THE ESTATE OF
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON,
Deceased

\~
LEITERS OF
(
( ADMINISTRATION
}

Roger T. Harmston is hereby appointed administrator
of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Witness G. ARTHUR GOODRICH, CLERK
of said Court with the seal thereof affixed
this 8th day of March A. D. 1941.
By G. ARTHUR GOODRICH, Clerk
By

Deputy Clerk

t

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ~ ss.
Before me, G. Arthur Goodrich, Clerk of the above
district court, in and for !Duchesne County, on this
8th day of March, A. D. 1941, personally appeared
Roger T. Harmston, who being duly sworn for himself says that he will perform, according to law the
duties of Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T.
Hlarmston, deceased.
ROGER T. HARMSTON
Subscribed and sworn to before me
the day and year aforesaid.
Attest:

G. Arthur Goodrich, Clerk

______________________Deputy.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"11. That the Oath of Office and Letters of Administration above mentioned have been lost or destroyed.
"12. That on May 9, 1941, the petitioner herein
filed its Complaint in this Court against Roger T. Harmston as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. In such action the petitioner sought
a judgment against Roger T. Harmston as such administrator for the amount owing upon the above mentioned notes and to foreclose the mortgages given to secure the same.
"13. That on May 13, 1941, the Sheriff of Duchesne County, Utah personally served summons upon
Roger T. Harmston, as administrator of the Estate of
Isa:belle T. Harmston, deceased, such summons having been served in Duchesne County, Utah."
(283 to 286)
The other evidence in the case came from four witnesses called by the bank, such witnesses being Arthur Goodrich, Arlene Smith, Edna L. Hartman and J. Rulon Morgan. Merrill H. Larson was called as a witness by the bank,
but upon objection by the appellants herein he was not permitted to testify to any of the issues here involved.
Arthur Goodrich testified that he was the Clerk of the
District Court of Duchesne County, Utah, continuously from
1934 to 1942 (Tr. 8). He identified a letter marked Exhibit A as being a letter which he received and answered.
The letter was offered in evidence and over objection of
counsel for the appellants was received in evidence. The
exhibit contained therein the following:
"As to Isabelle T. Harmston, the Savings & Trust
Company submitted their report as requested by the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court on September 4, 1940, and on December 4, 1940
an Order was signed by Judge Dallas H. Young discharging them as Administrator. On March 8, 1941
Roger T. Harmston filed his bond and oath of office
and is now the acting and qualified administrator of
the estate of Isa!belle T. Harmston."
The letter was on the stationery of Duchesne County,
and was signed by Mr. Goodrich.
Mr. Goodrich further testified that at the time he wrote
letters concerning the records in his office he always had
before him such records, and that was the case when he
wrote the letter about Mr. Harmston being the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. That
he did not know what became of the oath. That at the
time he served as clerk of the court he kept all the forms,
including oaths of office; that when asked to recite the oath
he said it stated: "I agree under the constitution to abide
by all the laws, and I will execute my duty with fidelity-!
don't remember." That the oath was the one usually employed (Tr. 13). That the oath was the regular Oath of
Office (Tr. 14). That the best recollection of the witness
was that the oath and bond were both brought in by Merrill Larsen (Tr. 15). It will be noted that the bond was
filed in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate on March 8, 1941.
See Probate Files in Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, page
235.
On cross-e~amination Mr. Goodrich testified that he
did not actually remember the Oath (Tr. 16); that he has
no independent recollection who was the notary on the oath
of office (Tr. 17). That he did not remember of any typewritten forms of oaths of office having been filed while he
was clerk (Tr. 18).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Arlene Smith, a witness called by the bank, in substance testified: That she served as deputy clerk of the
District Court of Duchesne County, Utah from November,
1940, until November, 1942. That her duties were writing
letters and filing and general office work. That she was
serving under Mr. Goodrich. That it was always the practice of Mr. Goodrich to have before him the records concerning which he wrote letters (Tr. 19). That she never
remembered writing a letter for Mr. Goodrich concerning
a record unless Mr. Goodrich had before him the record
concerning which he wrote (Tr.. 20). On cross-examination she testified that she did not recall the correspondence
with respect to the appointment of this man as administrator (Tr. 23-24).
The testimony of Edna L. Hartman, who served as assistant to Mr. Goodrich in 1935 up to 1938 and again in 1942,
is substantially the same as that of Mrs. Smith as to the
practice of Mr. Goodrich of having before him the record
when he wrote letters concerning the same (Tr. 26-29).
J. Rulon Morgan, a witness called by the petitioner,
in substance testified as follows: That he is a lawyer residing at Provo, Utah, and was a lawyer in 1941 (Tr. 34).
That he represented the Farmers & Merchants Bank in the
foreclosure proceedings in Civil Cases 1931 and 1932; that
he appeared as a witness in those cases; that he made inquiry from Mr. Goodrich, the clerk of the court, and from
Merrill Larson as to whether or not Roger T. Harmston
had taken an oath of office in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate prior to the time he took a judgment in the foreclosure
proceedings in the two cases. He was shown Petitioner's
Exhibit A and asked whether he had seen that before (Tr.
35) . Over objection to the question on various grounds,
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he was permitted to testify that he received the letter, Exhibit A, through the mail and after receiving the same he
went to Duchesne County for the purpose of securing decrees of foreclosure (Tr. 36). That before he offered evidence in support of the foreclosure proceedings, he examined the records and files in the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, and that upon such examination he found
a bond and an oath of office of Roger T. Harmston in the
files of that estate. That as he recalled there were also
Letters of Administration on the same paper as the oath of
office (Tr. 37). That the oath of office was in the usual
form, there was nothing unusual about it that attracted
the attention of the witness. That at the time he testified
in the foreclosure proceedings he had with him all of the
files in the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased (Tr.
38). Counsel for the appellant moved that the testimony
of the witness be stricken because he was the attorney for
both parties in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding. The
motion was denied (Tr. 38-39).
On cross-examination, Mr. Morgan was examined as
to his connection with the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston, deceased (Tr. 40). He testified that the interest that
the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston may have had in
the property foreclosed had vested in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate at the time of the foreclosure. That the estate
of Marion Eugene Harmston at most had only a nominal
interest in the property that was foreclosed in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings in cases 1931 and 1932 wherein the Farmers and Merchants Bank foreclosed the mortgages (Tr. 41-42).
Merrill H. Larson was called as a witness by the petitioner, and testified that he resides at Duchesne and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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,&.

lw was the attorney for Mr. Hannston in the matter of the

le~
gij~

estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. That upon his
being asked about whether or not he left with the clerk
of this court an oath of office in that estate an objection
was made by counsel for appellants on the ground that any
such testimony was privileged. The objection was sustained (Tr. 47-48). Thereupon counsel for the petitioner
stated that if permitted to do so he expected that Mr. Larson would testify that according to his best recollection
he saw an oath of office and bond of Roger T. Harmston
that was filed with the clerk of this court when the bond
was filed in March, 1941. No evidence was offered by the
appellants.

lc~

i~:

We have heretofore in this brief indicated the questions which we believe are presented for determination on
this appeal, but instead of discussing the matters as outlined by us, it will probably make the questions which divide us stand out more clearly if we follow the points as
stated in appellants' brief. We shall follow that procedure.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS OF APPELLANTS WHEREBY
THEY CONTENDED THAT THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT ROGER T. HARMSTON HAlD
TAKEN AN OATH OF OFFICE IN THlE ESTATE OF
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON MAY NOT PROPERLY BE
HEARD AND DETERMINED IN THIS PROCEEDING.
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POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED IN
EVIDENCE PETITIONER'S EXIDBIT A, THE SAME
BEING THE LETTER WRITIEN BY MR. GOODRICH
STATING THAT "ON MARCH 8, 1941 ROGER T. HARMSTON FILED HIS BOND AND OATH OF OFFICE AND
IS NOW THE ACTING AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. HARMSTON.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED IN
EVIDENCE THE FILES IN THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, THE SAME BEING CIVIL
NOS. 1931 AND 1932.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT DLD NOT ERR IN PERMITTING J.
RULON MORGAN TO TESTIFY.
POINT FIVE
CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY SOUGHT TO BE
ELICITED FROM MERRILL H. LARSON.
POINT SIX
THE FINDINGS OF FACf ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, THE FACI'S FOUND SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS OF APPELLANTS WHEREBY
THEY CONTENDED THAT THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT ROGER T. HARMSTON HAD
TAKEN AN OATH OF OFFICE IN THE ESTATE OF
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON MAY NOT PROPERLY BE
HEARD AND DETERMINED IN THIS PROCEEDING.

On page 13 of appellants' brief there is cited some of
the language used by the court in the case of Harmston,
administrator vs. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 247 Pac. (2d)
895 where it is said that "no motion had been made or proceedings brought to correct the records upon which appellants were relying. By admitting evidence contradicting
the record in the probate proceedings without a direct issue
in the proceedings that the record was not correct, this
court could not say the rights of the appellants were not
substantially effected."
Strictly speaking, the evidence, offered in the proceeding which was the subject matter of review in the case of
Harmston, administrator v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
supra, did not conflict with the record in the probate proceedings in the Isabelle Harmston estate. What was there
sought was to add to or re-establish a part of the record
in the probate proceedings. If the oral testimony which
respondent offered should be construed as contradicting
the record in the probate proceedings, then and in that case
such evidence would be inadmissible because of the elementary rule that oral evidence is not admissible to contradict
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the written record. A number of cases cited by appellants
in their brief support such doctrine and, of course, we have
no quarrel with that principle of law. Before oral evidence
is admissible to correct or add to the record, it must be
made to appear either that the record is contrary to the
truth or does not speak the whole truth. It was and is the
petitioner's contention, as will be seen from its Petition, that
the record in the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased,
does not now speak the whole truth, in that the oath of
office and letters of administration that existed in 1941
have either been lost or destroyed. It would indeed seem
to be a strange doctrine for this Court, or any other court,
to hold that it is proper to correct or to add to a record in
any given proceeding, by a proceeding had in some other
matter. If that were done, the courts would be confronted
with the dilemma of not knowing which of the two conflicting records is to be regarded as authentic and to be
binding on the parties to any proceeding where their rights
might be affected by what has been decided. In the numerous cases cited by the appellants there is at least one
case which holds that the records in a probate proceeding
may properly be corrected by one interested in· the property involved in such proceeding. Moore v. Braswell, 92
So. 451, 207 Ala. 333.
It will be seen that on pages 13 and 14 of appellants'
brief cases are cited which they claim are authorities for
the contention that the only way that the bank may properly proceed to litigate the question of whether Mr. Harmstan had or had not taken the oath of office is in the proceedings which have heretofore been reviewed by the court.
We have carefully read the cases cited by appellants in support of such contention, but as we read them they fall far
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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short of supporting that which is claimed for them. As
typical of the cases cited on pages 18 and 19 is that of Piebus v. Dunford, 114 Ut. 292; 198 Pac. (2d) 973, where it
is held that when a case is reversed the trial court shall
proceed to dispose of such case as though it had not been
decided, except when the Supreme Court has decided some
issue the trial court may not decide such decided issue contrary to the way it has been decided by the Supreme CoUL"i:.
This Court did not, in the Harmston v. Farmers Bank, supra, decide that the record of the Isabelle T. Harmston estate should be tried out in the cases whereby the Harmstons
seek to set aside the mortgage foreclosures. The authorities, as we read them, are all to the effect that the proper
way to correct or add to a record is to proceed directly in
the matter where it is claimed the record is inaccurate or
incomplete. 32 C.J.S. page 741, Sec. 809. It is there said:
"In such cases the proper remedy is by legal proceedings to have the missing record properly made up,
and for this purpose evidence is admissible to show
the existence and occurrence of the proceedings, the
record of which is to be supplied.''
The language just quoted is almost the same as the
language used by this Court in the Harmston v. Farttiers
& Merchants Bank case, supra. In support of the foregoing statement of law there is cited a number of cases. In
each of the cases so cited, the proceeding to correct the
record was had in the proceeding where the record was to
be corrected or re-established. We have found no case to
the contrary, and notwithstanding counsel for appellants
has cited a great number of cases in his brief, none of such
cases approve a proceeding where a record is corrected or
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re-established in a case other than the one where the record
is sought to be corrected or re-established.
If a proceeding may be had to correct a record in some
other proceeding, such a practice is certain to lead to confusion. Different results may be reached in the different
proceedings. The only parties bound by a given proceeding are the parties thereto and those in privity with such
parties. 30 Am. Jur. page 954, Sec. 222. All persons interested in an estate are parties to the probate proceedings of such estate, in that the probate of an estate is essentially a proceeding in rem. 33 C.J.S. page 890, Sec. 12
and cases cited in footnotes to the text.
If the correction of the record is had in the proceeding where the record is in error or incomplete, all persons
who may be interested in having a record in a particular
proceeding reflect the true state of what occurred therein,
will naturally look to such record and not to some other
record for the desired information, and when the information is acquired its legal effect is to bind not only the parties to such proceeding, but all who are in privity with such
parties.
In this case the proceedings had in the Isabelle T.
Harmston estate is binding upon all persons who were interested in such estate and all who are in privity with those
who had an interest in that estate during the course of its
being probated. 21 Am. Jur. page 377, Sec. 12 and cases
cited in foot notes.
On page 14 of appellants' brief, it is said that an issue
was joined in the case of Harmston v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, supra, as to whether or not Roger T. Harmston had
taken an oath of office in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate
pl'ior to the time that proceedings were had to foreclose
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the mortgages involved in the case of Harmston v. Farmers
& Merchants Bank. Counsel is in error in making such
statement. One of the grounds upon which this Court reversed the judgment in the case of Harmston v. Farmers
& Merchants Bank, supra, was because there was no such
issue raised by the pleadings in that case.

~·

On page 14 of appellants' brief it is also said that public interest requires that there be an end to litigation. We
quite agree with such statement, and the only safe way to
put an end to litigation with respect to whether or not
Roger T. Harmston did or did not take an oath of office, as
claimed by the petitioners herein, is to have that question
determined in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate. It is in
that estate where it is claimed the record is incomplete. If
and when the record is there completed, there will be an
end to litigation upon that particular matter.
POINT TWO

ili~
of iu

c]oi?.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITIED IN
EVIDENCE PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT A, THE SAME
BEING THE LETTER WRITTEN BY MR. GOODRICH
STATING THAT "ON MARCH 8, 1941 ROGER T. HARMSTON FILED HIS BOND AND OATH OF OFFICE AND
IS NOW THE AGriNG AND QUALIFIED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. HARMSTON.
On pages 14, 15 and 16 of appellants' brief it seems
they have some doubt as to whether or not there was at
the time of the trial actually in existence and available an
oath of office of Roger T. Harmston and letters of administration in the Isabelle Harmston estate that had been taken

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
and issued in March, 1941. Of course, if appellants are to
be understood as admitting the existence of such documents,
that is the end of this controversy.
It will be noted that in the petition filed herein, it is
alleged in paragraph 11 (R. 241) "that the oath of office
and letters of administration above mentioned have been
lost or destroyed and that the only record of the oath having been taken and letters of administration issued is the
finding to that effect in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding above mentioned." That allegation was denied in appellants' answer (R. 262).
At the commencement of this trial, it was stipulated
that in the files of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, there was not in the files at the time of the trial
either an oath of office or letters of administration of
Roger T. Hlarmston prior to February 10, 1948 (Tr. 2 to 4).
The files in the estate of Isabelle T .Harmston which were
before the trial court at the t~me of the hearing of this matter, and are now before this Court, show such to be the fact.
The fact that the oath of office and the letters of administration were not to be found in the files, and that there was
no record thereof prior to Feb. 10, 1948, would seem to be
conclusive that such documents were lost or destroyed. If
the same were in existence immediately before the trial,
the presumption would prevail that the clerk would perform his duty and have the same placed in the riles and
properly recorded. Moreover, the fact that Roger T. Harmston took an oath of office and letters of administration
were issued to him as of Feb. 10, 1948, clearly indicates that
the original oath and letters were not to be found, otherwise there was no occasion for Mr. Harmston to again take
an oath of office and have letters of administration issue
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to him (Tr. 238). It may be noted in this connection that
the letters of administration issued to Roger T. Harmston
on February 10, 1948, are not strictly in conformity with
the form prescribed by the statute, in that the same does
not contain the words, "State of Utah, County of Duchesne,"
nor do such letters contain the words, "of the District Court
in and for the County of Duchesne." If the form prescribed
by the statute is to be strictly complied with, Mr. Harmston is not administrator by reason of the letters issued to
him on February 10, 1948, but must rely on the letters issued to him in March, 1941. U. C. A. 1953, 102-4-10, Vol.
5, page 686. Probably more than enough has been said
about this phase of the case, because this matter was tried
by both sides on the theory that there was not in existence
at the time of the trial either an oath of office taken or letters of administration that were issued in March, 1941.
Such was not only the theory upon which the present case
was tried, but such was the theory upon which the case of
Harmston v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, supra, was disposed of, as fully appears from the opinion rendered in that
case.
On pages 16 and 17 of appellants' brief, cases are cited
to the effect that secondary evidence may not be admitted
in evidence if and when the primary or original evidence
is available. Of course, we do not contend to the contrary.
If, however, the best evidence is lost or destroyed, then secondary evidence is admissible. That is the holding of this
Court in the case of Harmston v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, and such is the law as stated generally by the authorities, including a number of the cases cited by appellants.
We are not entirely clear as to the basis for the argument touching the admission of the testimony of Mr. Good-
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rich and his two assistants. Of course, if there were a total
lack of evidence that Mr. Harmston had taken an oath of
office in March, 1941, there may be some merit to the contention that the evidence of Mr. Goodrich and his assistants was improperly received. That, however, is not this
case as is amply made apparent by the testimony of Mr.
Morgan and by the Findings of Fact by the court in the
mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The fact that the testimony of Mr. Goodrich and his assistants to the effect that
Mr. Goodrich always had before him the records concerning which he wrote, was offered and received before the
direct and positive evidence that there was an oath of office
and letters of administration in the Isabelle Harmston estate in 1941 'Cannot possibly be said to have prejudiced the
appellants. It is the uniform practice to permit counsel to
offer their proof in such order as they may determine, and
if evidence is offered and received in what may be said to
be out of logical sequence, such fact does not form the basis
of complaint because of the obvious reason that no prejudice can be founded upon such procedure.
Moreover, the law is well established that in many instances facts can be established only by circumstantial evidence. 20 Am. Jur. pages 258-260, Sec. 270-272. So also
is it the duty of one who is serving as a clerk of a district
court to answer inquiries concerning matters pending in
the court, and when he answered such inquiries the presumption prevails that the clerk does his duty.
The case of Tree v. White, et al, 171 Pac. (2d) 398, 110
Utah 233, cited by appellant on page 16, does not hold otherwise. The fact that the oath of office taken and the letSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ters of administration issued in the Isabelle T. Harmston
estate in 1941 were not to be found at the time of the trial
may tend to weaken, but surely not destroy, the presumption that the clerk failed to do his duty by truthfully stating that Roger T. Harmston had taken the oath of office
and filed his bond prior to the time of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. To say that the letter, Exhibit A, did
not tend to establish the claim of petitioner bank that Roger
T. Harmston was the qualified administrator of the estate
of Isabelle T. Harms ton at the time the letter was written
would be to reject evidence of considerable probative value.
Of course, Mr. Goodrich could not remember the language
or the existence of each oath of office that was in the office
of the clerk of the District Court of Duchesne County, Utah,
during the years that he served in such office, but it would
be rather strange for Mr. Goodrich to have written the letter without having made some investigation as to the facts
therein stated.
The testimony of Mrs. Hartman and Mrs. Smith tends
to establish a circumstance which corroborates the testimony of Mr. Goodrich. Even though such testimony is
not of great strength, as stated by ·counsel for appellants
on page 20 of their brief, such fact would not justify its
exclusion or constitute error because of its admission. Nor
is the statement contained in the letter, Exhibit A, that Mr.
Harmston had taken the oath of office and filed a bond in
the Isabelle Harmston estate a conclusion. It is the statement of a fact. How else could Mr. Goodrich make known
that Harmston had qualified as administrator?
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POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED IN
EVIDENCE THE FILES IN THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, THE SA:ME BEING CIVIL
NOS. 1931 AND 1932.

On pages 20 and 21 of appellants' brief attention is directed to certain of the allegations of the petition filed by
the petitioner bank herein, and it is argued that because
some of the paragraphs were so stricken that therefore the
court erred in admitting in evidence the files in those cases.
The purpose of pleading the proceedings had in the two
mortgage foreclosure proceedings was primarily to show
that the petitioner bank had an interest in the Isabelle
Harmston estate, and further to show that Roger T. Harmstan had known for nearly seven years that the bank
claimed he was the administrator of his mother's estate
as early as 1941, and that having been served with a sum·
mons in that estate as the administrator and having made
no claim to the contrary, he may not now be heard to say
that he was not such administrator.
A number of the allegations contained in the petition
of the bank were probably not necessary to allege or prove
in order to show that the bank had an interest in the property foreclosed, because the same was a part of the estate
of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. It was for that reason
that some of the allegations were stricken. As heretofore
stated in this brief, the purpose of this proceeding was to
establish the fact that Roger T. Harmston had taken an
oath of office and letters of administration had been issued
to him prior to the foreclosure of the mortgages. Even if
nothing had been alleged with respect to the mortgage foreSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I.

I.
i.

I

I.

I
I

!

J
)

I
I

23
closure proceedings, the files of such proceedings would
have been proper evidence in so far as the same tended to
show that Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office
in his mother's estate and that he was the administrator
thereof at the time of the foreclosure proceedings. It is,
of course, elementary that one need not plead the evidence
which one intends to offer in support of his cause.
Moreover, it will be noted that paragraph 13 of the
petition, wherein it is alleged that Roger T. Harmston was
served with summons as the administrator of the estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston by the Sheriff of Duchesne Cow1ty,
Utah, was not stricken. Nor was the paragraph 15 of the
petition stricken wherein it is alleged that a default judgment was rendered in favor of the bank against Mr. Harmston.
The authorities teach:

"* * * * default by a defendant operates as an admission of all matters alleged in plaintiff's pleading;
more particularly a default has been held to constitute
an admission of traversable allegations that are well
and properly pleaded and are material to the issues or
only such allegations as are necessary to obtain the
particular relief sought. The rules as to admissions
resulting from default have been said to obtain even
though the allegations are untrue."
49 C. J. S. page 358, Sec. 201 and cases cited in footnotes
"A default has been held to admit the capacity in
which plaintiff sues, that defendant is the person named
in the writ and intended to be sued, that he occupies
the position or status or fills the relation to others
which is alleged in the declaration, and that the court
has acquired jurisdiction of his person and of the cause
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of action. It also admits the due execution and validity
of the instrument sued on, that plaintiff's claim or demand is just and legal, and that defendant has no defense to the action."
49 C. J. S. page 359, Sec. 201.
Among the numerous cases cited in support of the text
are two Utah cases, namely Hurd v. Ford, 276 Pac. 908; 74
Utah 46; Utah Credit Men's Assoc. v. Bowman, 113 Pac. 63;
38 Uta.h 326. In this last mentioned Utah case in 38 Utah
at page 335, in quoting from 23 Cyc 752, it is said that:
"A default is an admission of every traversable
allegation of the declaration or complaint necessary to
plaintiff's cause of action that the defendant is the
person named in the writ and intended to be served, and
that the court has acquired jurisdiction of his person
and has jurisdiction of the cause of action."
In the case of Thorne v. McKinley Bros., 56 Pac. (2d)
204, 5 Cal. (2d) 704, the Supreme Court of California says
that a prior default carries with it the admission of all facts
alleged in that action, and that admission may be applied
against defendant in a new suit. An examination of the
cases cited in the footnotes to the above quoted text are
all to the same effect. So also the law announced and the
cases cited in 31 Am. Jur., page 136, Sec. 525, which are
to the same effect.
In this case Roger T. Harmston not only failed to ap-

pear and deny that he was the administrator of the estate
of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, when he was personally
served with a Summons by the Sheriff of Duchesne County, but he waited for a period of 6 years, 9 months and 11
days after he was served with Summons in which he was
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sued as the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston before he did anything by way of informing anyone
that he was not such administrator. Even at this late date,
he does not deny that he took the required oath of office
in the estate of his mother or that letters of administration
were issued to him. He contents himself with saying that
you cannot prove such facts because the files of the estate
do not so show. Courts of equity do not look with favor
on such claims. People v. Swaim, 80 Cal. 199, 22 Pac. 66.
In this case not only has Roger T. Harmston waited
these many years before making any claim that he was not
the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston at
the time he was served as such with a summons in the foreclosure proceedings, but he is confronted with a judicial determination that he was such, and unless the evidence of
the other witnesses who were called to testify are to be disbelieved, such determination finds support not only in Roger
T. Harmston's constructive admission on account of his
failure to testify, but also by the uncontradicted evidence
of circumstance wholly inconsistent with any conclusion
other than that such oath existed, and in addition thereto
positive evidence that there were such an oath and letters
of administration in the files of Isa:belle T. Harmston' s estate when the mortgage foreclosure proceedings were had.
At the former hearing of this matter we directed the
attention of the Court to the case of Intermill v. Nash, 94
Ut. 271, 75 Pac. (2d) 157, where it is held that:
"A judgment upon its face, or the judgment roll
upon inspection may show: First, that the Court had
jurisdiction of the res and the parties; second, that the
court did not have jurisdiction of the res or of the parties; or third, the record may be silent on the question
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of jurisdiction. In the first instance the record supplies all the evidence; in the second instance, the record itself shows the judgment void; and in the third
situation the record imparting verity, jurisdiction in the
court entering the judgment is presumed, since every
court has the initial right and duty to pass upon its
own jurisdiction."
In the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the evidence
shows that Roger T. Harmston as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston was personally served with
summons in Duchesne County by the Sheriff of that County. It thus clearly appears that the court had jurisdiction
of Roger T. Harmston in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings and there is nothing in the record in those cases which
shows or tends to show that the court did not have jurisdiction of the res. Indeed, the court found that Roger T.
Harmston was the administrator of the estate of Isabelle
T. Hlarmston, which, if true, would give the court jurisdiction of the res; that is the mortgaged property.

I,

Without belaboring this phase of the case at greater
length, the record in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings
contains the most reliable proof, if indeed not conclusive
proof, that Roger T. Harmston was the administrator of
the estate of his mother at the time of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings.

I:

POINT FOUR
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMI'ITING J.
RULON MORGAN TO TESTIFY.
Appellant contends that little or no credence should
be given the testimony of J. Rulon Morgan, because he at
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one time represented the administrator of the estate of
Marion Eugene fLarmston, the husband of Isabelle T. Harmston. Mr. Morgan testified that the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston was made a party as a mere nominal party;
that the estate was without any interest in the property
that was being foreclosed.
Counsel is in error when he says thrut the estate of
Marion Eugene Harmston was a co-maker of the notes and
mortgages. No one who purported to represent the estate
of Marion Eugene Harmston signed the note and mortgage
for $2500.00, and so far as appears, Isa!belle T. Harmston
never sought or was granted authority to sign the note and
mortgage for $4500.00 as the administratrix of the estate
of Marion Eugene Harmston.
There is nothing which shows or tends to show that
Mr. Morgan had any personal interest in either the estate
of Marion Eugene Harmston or Isabelle T. Harmston. On
the contrary, it is made to appear that Mr. Morgan was
meticulously careful in seeing that everyone who had an
interest in the property that was being foreclosed was made
a party defendant. It would be attributing to Mr. Morgan
extreme carelessness to reach the conclusion that he overlooked a matter so vital to the mortgage foreclosure pro..
ceedings as to take a chance on Roger T. Harmston not in
fact being the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, deceased. Not only was there the risk of having a defective foreclosure, but also the likelihood that he
may be charged with improper conduct in seeking to mislead the Court into making a finding contrary to the fact.
There is no conceivable reason why Mr. Morgan should
seek to foreclose the mortgages on the property of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston without having before the
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Court the administrator of that estate, and every reason
why he should be certain that all parties who had or might
have had an interest in the property being foreclosed were
properly before the Court. On page 28 of appellants' brief
some point is made about the T. being omitted from the
name of Roger T. Harmston; and of an S being added to
the word Roger. Obviously, such discrepancy is of no importance. It is inconceivable that anyone other than the
Roger T. Harmston who was sued as Roger T. Harmston,
as administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Hnrmston,
would take an oath of office in that estate or have letters
of administration issued to him as such administrator.
POINT FIVE
CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY SOUGHT TO BE
ELICITED FROM MERRILL Hl. LARSON.
The petitioner called Merrill H. Larson, who for a time
was the attorney for Roger T. Harmston in the proceedings
had in his mother's estate, whereby Roger T. Harmston
sought to be and was appointed administrator of suchestate. The testimony sought to be elicited from him was
whether or not he had seen an oath of office and letters
of administration in the matter of the estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, deceased. Objection was made to such testimony on the gr"9'und that any such testimony was privileged because of the relation of attorney and client. The
provision of the statute evidently relied upon is U. C. A.
1953, 78-24-8, subdivision 2 thereof, which provides:
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"(2) An Attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him or his advice given therein, in the
course of professional employment."
The testimony sought to be elicited from the witness
Merrill was in no way concerning any communication made
to or advice given Roger T. Harmston.
In the case of Dineris v. Phelan, 62 Ut. 387; 219 Pac.
114, it is held that an attorney is competent to testify with
reference to contents of a lost deed which he prepared for
a client, since such contents were not a part of a communication made to attorney by the client. For stronger ressons, an oath of offke taken in a probate proceeding and
letters of administration issued in an estate is in no sense
a communication made by a client.

I~

POINT SIX
THE FINDINGS OF FAcr ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, THE FACTS FOUND SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS.
These facts are established by the evidence without
conflict:
1. The District Court of Duchesne County, Utah, appointed Roger T. Harmston administrator of the estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased.
2. On March 8, 1941, a surety bond was furnished by
Roger T. Harmston, which bond was and is being used by
Mr. Harmston as his bond as administrator of that estate.
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3. l\1r. Morgan wrote to the Clerk of Duchesne County to ascertain if Mr. Harmston had qualified as administrator. In response to the letter the clerk informed Mr.
Morgan that Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office in that estate and that he was the qualified and acting
administrator of that estate.
4. Mr. Goodrich testified that it was his practice to
have before him the records concerning which he wrote letters, and that while he did not recall this particular oath
of office and letters of administration of Mr. Harmston,
they were, so far as he recalled, in the usual form.
5. Two of the assistants of Mr. Goodrich corroborated his testimony about his having before him the records ·concerning which he wrote.
6. Mr. Morgan testified that when the hearing on the
mortgage foreclosure proceedings were had, he testified in
such proceedings and that he had before him the oath of
office and letters of administration of Roger T. Harmston
in the estate of Isabelle T. HJarmston, deceased.
7. In the mortgage foreclosure proceedings the Sheriff of Duchesne County served upon Roger T. Harmston, as
administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, personally, a summons.
8. Roger T. Harmston failed to answer and a default
judgment was taken because of such failure.
9. In its Findings in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings the court found that Roger T. Harmston was the
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
estate of IsaJbelle T. Harmston, deceased.
10. No claim was made by or on behalf of Roger T.
Harmston that he was not the administrator of the estate
of Isabelle T. Harmston until 6 years, 9 mos. and 11 days
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after the decree of foreclosure, notwithstanding during the
greater part of that time the Farmers & Merchants Bank
and its grantee had possession of the property upon which
a foreclosure was had.
11. Roger T. Harmston, being present throughout the
trial, did not at the trial testify that he had not taken the
oath of office and that letters of administration had issued
to him as claimed by the petitioner.
12. When it was sought to have Merrill H. Larson, his
attorney, testify as to having seen the oath of office and
letters of administration claimed by the Farmers & Merchants Bank, counsel for Mr. Harmston interposed an objection which was without merit as to Roger T. Harmston
and especially as to the other heirs of !~~belle T. Harmston.
As opposed to this array of evidence, the appellants argue that respondent's evidence failed to establish the particular language in the oath and letters of administration.
Of course, it is ·unlikely that anyone could remember the
language of a document that he saw nearly fourteen years
ago. We doubt that either Mr. Harmston or his counsel
can remember the exact language contained in the oath and
letters that were issued in 1948.. Nor is the exact language
of the oath and letters of administration of controlling impoct:ance, because no rights are fixed by the language of an
oath of office or letters of administration. Moreover, the
evidence is that the oath of offke and letters of administration were on the usual forms that were in use at that
time. Compiled Laws of Utah 1943 that were in effect at
the time here involved provides for what shall be contained
in an oath of office and the form of letters of administration. U. C. A. 1943, 102-54-14 and 102-4-10. It is incon-
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ceivable that a spurious oath of office and letters of aQministration would be found in the matter of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston or that if such had been the case neither
Mr. Goodrich nor Mr. Morgan would have failed to observ~
such an unusual occurrence.
If the evidence in this case does not esta!blish the fact
that Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office and
that letters of administration had issued to him in his mother's estate, it is difficult to conceive of evidence that is sufficient.
Before concluding this brief, we wish to observe that
we have carefully read all of the numerous cases cited in
appellants' brief. To point out wherein such cases do not
aid appellants herein would extend this brief beyond reasonable Hmits. Suffice it to say that as we read such cases,
none of them make against the contention of the respondent.
We submit that the decree appealed from should be
affirmed with costs to respondent.
ELIAS HANSEN
J. RULON MORGAN
Attorneys for Respondent
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